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HARMONIZATION, HETEROGENEITY AND REGULATION:
CESL, THE LOST OPPORTUNITY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE
HARMONIZATION
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

1.

Introduction: Freedom of contract, mandatory terms, and the
CESL

Any system of contract law must deal with two broad classes of transactions:
those that take place within a single jurisdiction, and those which involve
cross-border transactions between two (or more) jurisdictions. In the former
case, the local law necessarily governs all parties. In the latter case, there is
often a question as to which system of law should govern the transactions.
Should the parties be allowed to choose the law of either jurisdiction, or are
there external constraints that require them to adopt the law of one or the other
jurisdiction?
This article examines that last question in connection with the various sales
transactions that are governed by the Common European Sales Law (CESL)1
proposal of the European Commission, which once enacted may be used by
firms on an optional basis to govern, at least in part, underlying contractual
rules. Any accurate overall assessment recognizes that the CESL, like all
contract codes, combines two types of provisions. The first are intended to
facilitate voluntary transactions. The second are intended to set out certain
mandatory terms. These mandatory terms do not force the parties to enter into
a particular transaction in services or goods. But once those parties choose a
particular transaction type, they are forced into discrete channels, and they
must accept the government’s mandatory terms to enter the market.
* Richard A. Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University Law
School, The Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, and the James
Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, the
University of Chicago. He would like to thank Oren Bar-Gill, Lisa Bernstein, Chantel Mak, and
Gerhard Wagner for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and Christopher
Dodge, Christopher Lang, and Sean Childers, NYU Law School, class of 2013, and Jordana
Haviv, Benjamin Margo, Joshua Stanton, NYU Law School, class of 2014, for their valuable
research assistance.
1. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common
European Sales Law, COM(2011)635 final (11 Oct. 2011) (hereinafter: CESL Proposal). The
CESL does not cover consumer-to-consumer (C2C) contracts.
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The CESL is, of course, an optional statute for dealing with cross-border
transactions. All parties can stay out of it if they wish. But if they choose to opt
out of CESL, they pay a high price, for under Article 6 of the Rome I treaty
they will be required to follow the consumer rules that apply in the consumer’s
“habitual residence” so long as the professional seller “by any means, directs
[his commercial or professional] activities to that country”.2 The central
function of the CESL is to avoid the inefficiencies of Article 6 by making the
CESL the domestic law within the Rome I framework for the parties who opt
into it. Thus it is said that:
“The Common European Sales Law will be a second contract law regime
within the national law of each Member State. Where the parties have
agreed to use the Common European Sales Law, its rules will be the only
national rules applicable for matters falling within its scope. Where a
matter falls within the scope of the Common European Sales Law, there is
thus no scope for the application of any other national rules.”3
Abstractly, it is difficult to object to the CESL to the extent that it is “[a]n
optional uniform contract law regime” that applies only to “those traders
wishing to use it for their cross-border trade”,4 especially since it appears that
traders can decide to opt into the system on a transaction-by-transaction
basis.5 But it is possible to criticize CESL for having set up the wrong set of
optional terms, which force the following unwise trade-off: the price for
uniformity in cross-border transactions is compliance with the unduly
burdensome substantive provisions in the CESL, which is required under the
proposed integration of the CESL with Rome I.6 At this point, the hard policy
question is why this, or any other, optional code should contain a long set of
mandatory provisions, mostly in business-to-consumer (B2C) contracts,
thereby forcing parties to adopt the CESL in particular transactions on an
all-or-nothing basis.
In order to implement its vision of an optional uniform regime the CESL
imposes an exacting legal regime in its chosen mixture of optional or
mandatory terms. First, under the CESL, the Explanatory Memorandum
states, “in business-to-business (“B2B”) transactions, traders enjoy full
freedom of contract and are encouraged to draw inspiration from the Common
European Sales Law in the drafting of their contractual terms”.7 So far, so
2. Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June
2008 (hereinafter: Rome I).
3. CESL Proposal, 6.
4. Ibid., 8.
5. Ibid.,
6. Ibid., 2–4.
7. Ibid., 18.
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good. But not quite good enough. Thus Article 1 of the CESL endorses this
principle of freedom of contract, but only “subject to any applicable
mandatory rules,” which include in Article 2 a non-waivable duty on all parties
to meet an obligation of good faith and fair dealing, coupled with in Article 3
an obligation to “co-operate with each other to the extent that this can be
expected for the performance of their contractual obligations,” which term
could easily be read as non-waivable as well.
The duty of good faith is found in other codes, including the Uniform
Commercial Code provisions on unconscionability, which have been
sparingly applied in recent years. In business transactions in the US, good
faith now tends to function only as a default provision.8 In contrast under the
CESL good faith obligations are far more robust, applying to all B2B
transactions. The provision covers not only businesses and consumers, but
also extends to all traders, including any natural or legal person who is acting
for purposes relating to that person’s trade, business, craft, or profession.9 The
opening Explanatory Memorandum in paragraph (31) only adds uncertainty
to the scope of the good faith doctrine, which now depends, in part “on the
relative level of expertise of the parties and should therefore be different in
business-to-consumer transactions and in business-to-business transactions.
In transactions between traders, good commercial practice in the specific
situation concerned should be a relevant factor in this context”.10 Under the
first quoted sentence, it is uncertain whether all B2B and B2C are judged by
uniform categorical rules tailored for each respective class, or whether the
content of the duty may also vary within each of these two classes, depending
on “relative expertise”. In practice, the categorical approach will win by
default as individual determinations of good faith are not possible in a mass
economy.
In addition, paragraph (31) also makes it clear:
“As some rules constitute specific manifestations of the general principle
of good faith and fair dealing, they should take precedent [sic] over the
general principle. The general principle should therefore not be used as a
tool to amend the specific rights and obligations of parties as set out in the
specific rules.”11

8. Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to
allow a generalized obligation of good faith “to override or strike express contract terms”). For
my defence of a narrow reading of unconscionability, see Epstein, “Unconscionability: A
critical reappraisal”, 18 Journal of Law & Economics (1975), 293–311.
9. CESL Proposal, cited supra note 1, Art. 2(e).
10. Ibid., 20.
11. Ibid.
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It appears that many specific rules fall into this class. Articles 168 to 171
dealing with “Late Payments by Traders,” make its rules explicitly mandatory
on all traders, without any limitation to either B2C or SME contracts. Articles
172 to 177, which deal with Restitution on contract termination, are
mandatory such that “[i]n relations between a trader and a consumer the
parties may not to the detriment of the consumer, exclude the application of
this Chapter or derogate from or vary its effects”. The prescriptive periods set
out in Article 186 state that “a contract between a trader and a consumer may
not be applied to the detriment of the consumer”. It is not clear, however,
whether some portion of these restrictions on prescription carry over to
contracts among traders, as part of their non-waivable obligation to deal in
good faith. “Full freedom of contract” cannot survive this thicket of provisions
that applies to all traders.
All of these provisions raise general considerations that are not applicable
only to the CESL, but to any effort to rationalize sale arrangements. In my
view, the general presumption that regulation of business behaviour is a harm
until shown to be a good applies to the CESL as it does to other aspects
commercial law. In this paper, I shall examine this theme in the following
sequence. First, section 2 offers a general examination of the relationship
between transaction costs and gains from trade. Section 3 continues this
general theme by asking what concerns with heterogeneity, administrative
burdens, and public choice theory tell us about the mandatory terms that
CESL includes in its optional legislation. Section 4 examines the gains from
vertical harmonization, and rejects the view that these require the adoption of
a single set of terms or are compatible with a wide range of EU regimes from
which the parties are allowed to choose. Section 5 contrasts the CESL’s
approach with the successful use of open choice in the United States with both
forum selection and choice of law clauses. Section 6 then argues that these
principles indicate that CESL is unwise to include separate options to deal
with the cross-border issues faced by SMEs. The conclusion of this article is
that the stiff terms found in the optional approach of CESL constitute a lost
opportunity by ratcheting up, and not tamping down, on the overall level of
regulation in cross-border sales transactions.
2.

Transactions costs and gains from trade

The complex structure of the CESL’s basic strategy offers an occasion to
re-examine the basic relationships between transactions costs and gains from
trade, on which the success of any regulatory scheme necessarily turns. As a
general matter, we should be suspicious of these State-imposed tie-in
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arrangements, whereby two parties must agree to one set of State-imposed
terms in order to adopt a contract that otherwise reflects their own joint
wishes. The risk here is that the gains from the voluntary portion of the deal
will be eroded by the implicit losses that both parties sustain when the State
engrafts its own requirements onto their agreement.
To see why, note that the key challenge in any voluntary transaction is set
out by one deceptively simple equation that derives squarely from the Coasean
(or transaction-cost economics) tradition. The parties themselves have a set of
business objectives which should produce joint gains so long as each party
receives in the transaction something that it values more than the things that it
surrenders, which, as rational agents, they will do. These advantages in any
individual case are not determined by any general contract theory, for they
derive from the needs and desires of the parties to the particular transaction.
But whatever the doubts about the scope of the principle of mutual gain, it
surely covers all transactions governed under the CESL.
Notwithstanding these putative gains, all voluntary transactions must
negotiate a set of business obstacles, both in finding the right trading partners,
and setting the right contractual terms to increase the odds of mutual gains, as
the CESL itself stresses.12 The basic point can be made just by looking at a two
party case as it relates to transaction gains, G, and transaction costs, T. If G =
Gb + Gs, and T = Tb + Ts, the task in all these cases is to make sure that G > T,
for otherwise the transaction implodes. Note that it is possible for G > T even
if Gb (or Gs) < Tb (or Ts) for any given party. What is required in that situation
is for the party with the lion’s share of the gain to pick up (by modification in
the contract price) some of the transaction costs borne in the first instance by
its opposite number, so that each party generates gain, at which point the two
together are able to go ahead with these transactions.13 Stated otherwise, the
deal will only go through if for any person Tx is always less than Gx from
which it always follows that G > T for all people. Put otherwise, if the
distributional constraint is satisfied, the aggregate constraint is necessarily
satisfied as well. In addition, if the aggregate constraint is satisfied and
initially the distributional constraint is not, a side payment between buyer and
seller can solve the problem, unless the cost of making that side payment
exceeds the gains that would otherwise be obtainable.
12. CESL Proposal, cited supra note 1, 4.
13. Just this happens in all two-sided markets, on which see, Epstein, “Dunwody
distinguished lecture in law, the constitutional paradox of the Durbin amendment: How
monopolies are offered constitutional protection denied to competitive firms”, 63 University of
Florida Law Review (2011), 1324. The classic article on the subject is Baxter, “Bank
interchange of transactional paper: Legal and economic perspectives”, 26 Journal of Law &
Economics (1983), 541–588.
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Heterogeneity, administrative burdens and public choice

The operation of a market will only remain fully open so long as any
State-imposed restrictions provide benefits sufficient to offset their admitted
costs, for if Gx > Tx then the gains from trade still exceed the transaction costs
in question. It is at this point heterogeneity enters into the analysis, by asking
whether this constraint is satisfied on a transaction-by-transaction basis. The
CESL and its report use “trader,” “consumer” and “SME” in the singular,
which (perhaps unintentionally) creates the unfortunate impression that no
variation within each of these two classes matters for the overall analysis. All
consumers are said to have similar deficits and all SMEs face similar
difficulties. In virtually all market settings the implicit assumption of a zero
variance necessarily leads the overall analysis astray. In voluntary markets,
these differences are positive because the greater variation increases gains
from trade.14 Yet heterogeneity poses real challenges to regulations with
uniform application. The more heterogeneous the class, the more difficult it is
to determine the impact of regulation, first in the individual case and then in
the aggregate. High variation makes it hard to adopt a simple rules approach
that sets a uniform standard for, say, all consumers. But it also makes it highly
unlikely that any flexible or case-by-case approach can make reliable
determinations at reasonable cost. Under the CESL, the high variance makes
it highly likely that a regulation intended to protect the needy and
unsophisticated will necessarily increase the transactional burdens on
knowledgeable merchants and consumers. The relationship between Gx and
Tx will differ strongly across persons, for even if G > T for some people, T >
G for others.
The full range of mandatory devices under the CESL responds to this risk
by adopting certain standardized measures to combat perceived forms of
market failure. The Explanatory Memorandum rests its case for its single set
of optional rules on the proposition that its “optional uniform contract
regime . . . would also at the same time increase the level of consumer
protection offered to consumers who shopped across a border thereby creating
confidence as they would experience the same set of rights across the
Union”.15
Unfortunately, this rationale is ill-conceived on both counts. There is no
general principle that establishes that any “increase” in the level of consumer
protection will enhance consumer welfare. Setting consumer protections too
high could easily block sensible consumer transactions. Nor will the CESL be
14. For discussion, Epstein, “Inside the Coasean firm: Why variations in competence and
taste matter”, 54 Journal of Law and Economics (2012), s.41-s.62.
15. CESL Proposal, cited supra note 1, 8.
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able to supply the “same set of rights” to all consumers, given that its rules will
not displace the higher levels found in any Member State.16 The best way to
expand consumer confidence is for firms to invest in their brand name and
reputation. In some cases that could include a statement that it adheres to the
optional CESL terms, but by the same token, it could also achieve the same
result by signing on to an optional code prepared by any other private or public
body.
These irreducible variations among regulated parties places make it highly
unlikely that any single optional code, especially one as intrusive as the CESL,
will work in most or all cases. Two large forces are constantly at work in this
context. First, legal rules are never costless to promulgate or enforce on the
public side, or to comply with on the private side. For purposes of exposition,
setting G = T is a sensible first working assumption for additional regulation.
There is every reason to think that G > T for the first round regulations for a
wholly unregulated market. There is, for example, a strong case for some
formality, like the English Statute of Frauds, or system of recordation for
certain classes of transactions, or even some minimum disclosure norm
directed at systematic forms of misinformation. But by the same token, at the
margin, the assumption that T > G gains strength once those fundamental
issues have already been addressed. The drafters of the CESL tend to
underrate the large administrative, compliance and error costs of
implementing new rules, by understating the risk that regulation is badly
designed, subject to ambiguity, or pressure from political interest groups. The
slippage between what was enacted at the legislative level and the set of rules
that administrators implement on the ground is large. It is a common, but not
invariant practice, for administrators sympathetic to the basic mission of a
statute to expand its scope, which commonly happens in the United States
with the aggressive enforcement of environmental, anti-discrimination, or
consumer protection statutes. To give but one example, the decision of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to treat carbon dioxide as a pollutant
has resulted in the massive expansion of EPA authority.
Second, the dynamic effects of interventionist rules are in general negative,
which makes it less likely that parties will opt in to CESL on a voluntary basis,
even though it displaces the separate consumer protection laws of the
individual Member States. Thus in dealing with any consumer or SME rules,
assume that the less-sophisticated half of SMEs or consumers stand to benefit
from the regulation and the more-sophisticated half of SMEs or consumers are
hurt by them, in equal degrees. Over time, the harm to the more-sophisticated
group will reduce its level of growth relative to the less-sophisticated group, as
the even-handed application of uniform rules operates as an implicit
16. Ibid., 2.
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cross-subsidy of weak consumers by their stronger counterparts. In addition,
the individual in the stronger group will tend to become less careful in their
own practices, because they know that they can now take advantage of the set
of public law protections now in place. If incentive effects of protective rules
are negative and their enforcement costs are positive, the only debate is about
the magnitude of the social loss, not its existence. Even within an optional
system, firms will be more reluctant to opt in to rules with these effects.
The removal of the protective devices has, moreover, exactly the opposite
effect. The weak consumers now know that they will operate at a systematic
disadvantage to their stronger counterparts, unless they improve their
performance. In this context, these consumers use firm branding as a low cost
way to assess quality. To be sure, this passive, if low cost, strategy may not
allow these weak players to match the performance of the stronger group with
its multiple sources of information. In an unregulated market, moreover,
nothing precludes weaker consumers from taking advice from strong ones, or
otherwise acquiring the education or experience needed to improve their own
performance, whether or not a firm opts into the CESL. The dynamic effects
therefore strongly favour holding back on these various forms of protection.
Once again opting out of CESL becomes, relatively speaking, a more
appealing alternative.
In reaching this conclusion about the particulars of the CESL, it is not my
intention to reject the use of any and all remedies for fraud, either before or
after the fact. Some of these measures would be adopted even in an optional
system. But that is most likely to happen with antifraud protections that meet
one of two conditions. First, it is critical to identify a standard set of
transactions in which fraud has been practised, which calls for legal remedies.
For example, the rise of fraud-rings to obtain benefits from no-fault insurance,
workers compensation or health care fraud is often a major problem that
involves just these issues.17 In dealing with these cases, the best protection
often involves cutting out or limiting certain entitlements that breed the fraud,
rather than using higher standards of proof for policing applications. Long
(i.e. 14 day) return periods for consumers under the CESL18 could easily result
in the return of goods that the consumer wanted for a single occasion or which
were damaged by improper use. The CESL does impose some narrow limits
on the right of return,19 but these may well be far less robust than those
17. Schwartz, “Waste, fraud, and abuse in workers’ compensation: The recent California
experience”, 52 Maryland Law Rev. (1993), 983–1015 (detailing fraud mechanisms in
California for so called mental-mental cases in California). A mental-mental case is one where
an external stimulus triggered a psychological reaction, without physical invasion or physical
injury.
18. CESL Proposal, cited supra note 1, Arts. 41–42.
19. Ibid., Art. 45.
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supplied in voluntary markets, at which point the well-behaved consumers
will have to subsidize the misconduct of others. These mandatory terms offer
yet another reason for traders to opt out of the CESL.
More generally, the term “consumer fraud” always carries two distinct
meanings: the first is fraud on consumers, the second is fraud by consumers.
In my view, the second risk is greater than the former risk for two reasons:
first, the reputational constraint on major firms is so powerful that if they
make serious errors in individual cases, they face the risk that an entire
consumer population could be lured to a competitor. Second, given the level of
direct regulation already in place, traders already face serious sanctions for
modest offences. Let the individual consumer commit a fraud, and there is no
effective reputational check or form of legal redress. It is for good reasons that
large firms keep close tabs on the complaint records of their customers. They
typically have no remedy against dubious consumer behaviour, so they must
be alert not to preserve or expand relationships with high risk customers. The
legal system therefore should always be alert to offset these unprincipled
consumer advantages.20
Second, the anti-fraud regulations must be narrowly tailored to the fraud
risk which allows their reliable use at low cost. The best illustration of such a
practice may involve the use of the Annual Percentage Rate (or even the
expanded Schumer Box)21 in consumer lending transactions. Use a few key
measures and avoid information overload or mistakes in communication. The
CESL, however, has no such modest anti-fraud ambition. Instead it rests on the
undefended claim that vertical harmonization within the EU should be paired
with highly intrusive consumer protection regulation.
4.

The elusive gains from harmonization

One common theme in dealing with CESL involves the tricky issue of how
much to harmonize different legal systems. On this matter, the CESL by
design does nothing to address the differences in the sales law of Member
States as it applies only to internal transactions. Those differences, of course,
would be eliminated if these Member States all adopted CESL for their
internal business, which they are free to do. The stated objective of CESL
however, is to create an optional instrument that paves the way for vertical
competition between CESL and the contract laws of various Member States in
20. For illustration, see Wagner, in this issue, speaking about the return policies under
CESL.
21. The Schumer box is named after then-Congressman Charles Schumer who proposed it
as a device to list all the key terms in covered credit transactions. For a general description, see
credit.com at <www.credit.com/products/credit_cards/schumer-box.jsp>.
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dealing with these cross-border transactions. But the Explanatory
Memorandum does not do a good job in explaining why this extra measure of
competition is likely to be adopted by firms, given the large dose of mandatory
provisions that it contains. Traders can unilaterally increase the benefits they
provide to consumers in any case they choose, without having to bear the cost
of mandatory provisions that they do not wish to include. Indeed if the need for
harmonization were that pronounced, individual firms and industry groups
would already have developed their own standardized set of background terms
to respond to any perceived difficulties. It is precisely because that has not
happened that the anticipated gains from the CESL are not likely to be large.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the CESL’s defence of vertical
harmonization begins with this observation: “The existing harmonization of
consumer law at Union level has led to a certain approximation in some areas
but the differences between Member States’ laws remain substantial”.22 But it
then quickly veers to assume that more protection is better when it insists: “the
Common European Sales Law would contain fully harmonized consumer
protection rules providing for a high standard of protection throughout the
whole of the European Union”.23 Or again, “The minimum harmonization
approach meant that Member States had the possibility to maintain or
introduce stricter mandatory requirements than those provided for in the
acquis”.24 And in a somewhat different key: “It should also include fully
harmonized provisions to protect consumers”.25 Using only these modest
justifications, the CESL’s new provisions, as detailed by Bar-Gill and
Ben-Shahar, are truly breathtaking in their scope. They deal with mandated
provisions, mandated disclosures, mandated rules for entering and exiting
contracts, and sticky pro-consumer default terms.26 The CESL opts not just for
uniformity, but largely, but not entirely, for a uniformly higher level of
consumer protection than is found in many of the laws of the Member States.
It is, however, an open question whether the gains from uniformity
outweigh the losses associated with the further diminution of freedom of
contract under the CESL for both business and consumer contracts. Any gains
from uniformity are limited for any firm doing business in its home market,
the EU market, and each State in which it enters into consumer transactions.
That proliferation of laws necessarily makes it more difficult for any firm to
give the same standard set of terms to all customers regardless of their
location. There is no reason to eliminate the CESL, but the odds of it being
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

CESL Proposal, 2.
Ibid., 4 (emphasis added).
Ibid., 5 (emphasis added).
Ibid., 16.
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, in this issue, 2–3.
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adopted would be reduced if all Member States were allowed to offer on the
same optional basis a set of contract terms for traders to adopt. These options
need not eliminate all mandatory terms, but they do have the advantage of
forcing the CESL to compete with other systems for adoption. Using this
competitive mechanism among Member States does not require any a priori
judgments about the trade-offs between the costs and benefits of government
programmes.
The CESL, however, flatly prohibits any inter-jurisdictional competition
over contract terms to deal with the question of vertical competition. To be
sure, the defence of the CESL is correct to note that the proposal is able “to
contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by making available
a voluntary uniform set of contract law rules”.27 It is clear that subsidiarity
does require that that action be taken at the Union level, since no State has the
power to regulate cross-border transactions for all States. It is equally clear
that a single set of EU terms would be necessary if the CESL were mandated
for cross-border transactions. But once the CESL is made explicitly optional
for each trading party, subsidiarity no longer requires that only the CESL be
made available to facilitate cross-border trade.28 Nothing in the principle of
subsidiarity prevents the European Commission from letting any Member
State provide its preferred set of optional terms for all traders to use in their
cross border transactions, regardless of location. On this view the CESL will
then face a variety of competitors in the effort to achieve vertical
harmonization. Indeed, why limit the set of optional rules only to Member
States? The EU could also allow every trade association in the EU to roll out
its own terms for use. The University of Chicago could also post on its
web-page its rival to the CESL, just as the Creative Commons posts a wide
range of possible licenses for the use of copyrighted material.29 Opening the
CESL up to competitors has no downside in the market for vertical
harmonization, so long as Member States continue to have the right to impose
their own mandatory conditions for the protection of their local consumers.
Competition can show whether CESL’s implicit linkage between more
regulation and vertical harmonization can gain market traction.

27. Ibid.
28. CESL Proposal, 21.
29. See Creative Commons, at <creativecommons.org/licenses>.
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Jurisdictional issues: Forum selection, choice of law, and
mandatory terms

The fundamental decision in CESL is to insist that the only parties that can
take advantage of its vertical harmonization are those that accept its strict dose
of mandatory terms. One implicit assumption in that view is that jurisdictional
competition over the choice of these transnational rules should be regarded as
a race to the bottom, which should be avoided at all costs. A different take on
this subject comes, however, from the American case law which resolves these
tensions in the law of consumer contracts in favour of jurisdictional
competition. In its formative stages, the American law tied personal
jurisdiction in contractual disputes to the defendant’s presence in the territory
when the suit was brought.30 It did not ask whether the defendants’ presence at
that location reflected the joint preferences of the parties at the time of the
agreement, for it allowed a defendant who left the place where the contract was
made and performed to defeat jurisdiction by leaving before suit was filed.
Over time, that misguided territorial fixation unravelled,31 in favour of an
approach that looked to the “minimum contacts” that the parties to the
transaction had at the time of its occurrence.32 The minimum contacts rule
shifts the legal focus back from the time the dispute arises to the time of the
transaction, and thus, I believe, edges closer to the correct approach, which
lets the parties select their own forum and own substantive rules by agreement,
which often happens whenever a large number of repetitive transactions raise
the same issues.
The single most instructive decision in the United States is Carnival Cruise
Lines v. Shute.33 Carnival Cruise addresses this jurisdictional question under
the same contractual framework that applies to the substantive terms under
CESL. In Carnival Cruise, the forum selection clause required the passengers,
the Shutes, to litigate their personal injury claims against Carnival Cruise only
in Florida. The Court held that this clause bound the Shutes, residents of
Washington State, for injuries that took place on board a ship in international
waters. Under Carnival Cruise the Supreme Court would have also upheld any
choice of law provision requiring the use of Florida law, given that no
territorial law clearly governs disputes that arise in international waters.
30. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
31. For my account, see Epstein, “Consent, not power, as the basis of jurisdiction”, (2001)
University of Chicago Legal Forum 1–34.
32. See International Shoe v. Washington, 325 U.S. 310 (1945), allowing the State of
Washington to sue International Shoe in State court for sales taxes owed on sales within the
State.
33. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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These clauses are in obvious tension with the consumer-first approach of
CESL, which ties the choice of law in consumer transactions to the
consumer’s habitual residence.34 But why find some public policy objection
to the terms upheld under the American approach? Consumer protection is not
an end itself, especially in competitive markets; it can be justified, if at all,
solely as a means to maximize the net value for both parties. The choice of the
correct forum and the substantive law depends not solely on the one
transaction but on the full portfolio of transactions that face the firm. Carnival
Cruise shows the importance of taking this broader perspective. The
passengers on any given cruise come from all over, and the place of injury
could be in any one of a number of domestic or foreign territories, or, as in
Carnival itself, on the high seas. To allow the consumer to impose, as of right,
either forum selection or choice of law clauses in his or her own State could
create awkward situations by forcing a seller to litigate its disputes in multiple
jurisdictions (including those in foreign countries) whenever many passengers
are injured in a given accident. Picking the home State reduces those costs ex
post for some parties enough to increase the value of the contract ex ante for all
parties, by reducing the costs of potential legal defence; it also allows for
easier consolidation of multiple claims. A uniform rule for all consumers of a
single firm could easily be preferable to the current set of arrangements under
European law where each consumer is given the protection of the law of his or
her Member State.
In principle, one could fear that these forum selection and choice of law
clauses could be rigged to favour the defendant. It is easy to imagine, and even
possible to find clauses that meet that description, such as those found in the
notorious Gateway 2000 contract, whose reference to arbitration before the
International Chamber of Commerce did not reveal its steep non-refundable
filing fees, which were typically in excess of the amount in controversy.35 But
the ability to invalidate any egregious clause does not require the wholesale
invalidation of any all choice of law provisions. On this issue, the U.S.
Supreme Court adopted two simple safeguards against this type of advantage
taking, which in tandem seem to have worked well. By the first, the dominant
party has to have some independent and prior connection with the chosen
forum. By the second, that party has to choose this forum for all future
disputes, not just some. Virtually every firm can live comfortably within the
34. See CESL Proposal, 15: “whenever a trader directs its activities to consumers in another
Member State the consumer protection provisions of the Member State of the consumer’s
habitual residence that provide a higher level of protection and cannot be derogated from by
agreement by virtue of that law will apply, even where another applicable law has been chosen
by the parties”.
35. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (arbitration
before International Tribunal with high fees undisclosed in basic contract).
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safe harbour created by these dual limitations. The history after Carnival
Cruise is not replete with businesses seeking to push the envelope in either
forum-selection or choice-of-law provisions, precisely because these
well-designed constraints protect customers against roguish surprises without
crippling honest cost-minimizing transactions. As best one can tell, most use
their own State of business. Indeed the most recent uneasiness with Carnival
Cruise is well aware of the competing efficiency claims, but it relies, without
elaboration, on general statements on the dangers of contracts of adhesion in
ordinary consumer transactions,36 which are of course always at play in the
various issues that are regulated by CESL. But the subsequent case law
follows the initial decision pretty faithfully.37 The solution looks efficient.
Why then rule it out of bounds?
6.

Special rules are not needed to spur cross border transactions
for SMEs.

The previous discussion of forum selection and choice of law provisions
points out why it is dangerous to think that special rules are needed to deal with
any subclass of cross-border transactions. The gist of the case for these special
rules is contained in these two paragraphs:
“Differences in contract law between Member States hinder traders and
consumers who want to engage in cross-border trade within the internal
market. The obstacles which stem from these differences dissuade traders,
small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in particular, from entering
cross border trade or expanding to new Member States’ markets.
Consumers are hindered from accessing products offered by traders in
other Member States.”38
36. See Davis and Hershkoff, “Contracting for Procedure”, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (2011)
507–564, 525, n. 63: “In Carnival Cruise, the Court ratified use of a forum selection clause in
a standard contract between a large company and an elderly consumer who did not see the term
before agreeing to the deal, holding that such provisions presumptively are acceptable. 499 U.S.
at 593–594.” As noted earlier in the discussion of consumer variation, the “elderly consumer”
should carry no weight. First, these consumers get the same deal as the most informed
consumers. Second, there is no rule that divides consumers into subclasses that makes any
sense. And third, if anything, the likelihood that the plaintiff’s wife caused her own injury is
greater in these cases, where assumption of risk, based on known public conditions is likely to
play a very large role in connection with background conditions at sea. Davis and Hershkoff rely
on Ehrenzweig, “Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws”, 53 Colum. L. Rev. (1953),
1072–1090, 1076.
37. See e.g. Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 889 N.E.2d 687 (Ill App. 2008)
(upholding clause). For an exhaustive collection, see 4 A.L.R. 4th 404 (WEST 2012).
38. CESL Proposal, 2.
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“The costs resulting from dealing with various national laws are
burdensome particularly for SME. In their relations with larger
companies, SME generally have to agree to apply the law of their
business partner and bear the costs of finding out about the content of
the foreign law applicable to the contract and of complying with it. In
contracts between SME, the need to negotiate the applicable law is a
significant obstacle to cross-border trade. For both types of contracts
(business-to-business and business-to-consumer) for SME, these additional transaction costs may even be disproportionate to the value of
the transaction.39
According to the drafters, the cure for these alleged defects is the creation of
“a self-standing uniform set of contract law rules” for these SMEs,40 which “is
also consistent with the Union policy of helping SME benefit more from the
opportunities offered by the internal market”.41 The entire approach is,
however, subject to criticism on both empirical and theoretical grounds.
Hubbard has offered a powerful critique of the so-called Eurobarometer
studies, showing that those firms that want to engage in cross border
transactions are already there, and that most mom-and-pop businesses are not
included in their ranks.42
His critique does contradict the possibility that better studies could show a
higher volume of cross-border transactions. But even if that were true, there is
still no reason to fashion special protective rules in this context. Initially, it
seems clear that any consumer protection found in the CESL should not apply
to transactions with SMEs. So, as a matter of general theory, why worry which
body of contract law is used? As noted earlier, the key question in all cases is
whether the sum of the transaction costs for both parties exceeds the potential
gains from trade. That principle is ignored by any one-sided effort to reduce
the costs of the small SME, which will, of course, increase the cost for the
larger firms with whom they do business. So long as there is any element of
variation across firms, there is no reason to believe that an externally driven
shift in legal regimes will improve the overall rate of contracting, or indeed
that the overall rate should be increased.
As the CESL proposal notes, there are many other regulatory reasons which
make it more difficult to do cross-border transactions. In addition, the costs of
these transactions are likely to be higher even if there are no differences
whatsoever in dealing with contract terms, precisely because it is harder for
39.
40.
41.
42.

Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 11.
Ibid., 7.
Hubbard, “Another look at the Eurobarometer surveys”, in this issue.
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parties to work at a distance to iron out their differences or to make
assessments of the credibility of their trading partners. The strong preference
for doing business within the Member States may well be attributable to some
combination of clashing regulatory regimes on the one hand and
well-developed internal markets on the other. Expanding the scope of markets
by knocking down trade barriers is always a desirable good, and in this regard
the optional nature of the CESL reduces the risk in question. But this optional
provision does not look to be optimal, and, as is the case with other optional
provisions, the correct approach of the European Commission should be to
make as many options available as possible, and not to restrict the parties to its
own preferred choice, which may well not match up with the preferences of
either party. Uniformity in this instance is a way to minimize total transaction
costs, which is not likely to be reached by singling out SMEs for special
treatment.
7.

Conclusion

As a matter of first principle, the objectives of the CESL are laudable insofar
as the law is intended to increase the options available to parties in
cross-border transactions. But it is important to ask the question of whether
the option that the CESL provides is the ideal choice for the occasion when it
ties the advantages of a uniform set of laws for all cross-border transactions to
the acceptance of a strict regime of consumer protection. On this score, the
chief objection to the CESL is that it will not unlock its full potential because
the options that it provides will impose a heavy set of mandatory terms that are
likely to make it less attractive than the current regimes now in place by the
Member States. As a result, three final points are worth noting.
First, harmonization need not be tied to an effort to raise the level of
regulation in all cross-border transactions, whether they involve consumers or
SMEs. Harmonization downward must in principle be regarded as at least as
desirable as harmonization upward, given that overregulation is a serious risk
in both the long and the short term.
Second, coherence in individual transactions does not require
comprehensive EU articulation of either mandatory or background norms. For
mandatory terms, one possible system is to allow each Member State to
articulate the rules that it wishes to impose, so that firms could then pick from
that roster the terms that they want, knowing that if these are too one-sided,
they will lose customers to rival firms who select packages that are more
favourable to customers. For transactions between SMEs and larger firms,
there is no need for intervention at all, as the two parties should, in line with the
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American practice after Carnival Cruise, let whoever wants specify the
background terms of their choice, not only on forum selection or choice of law
terms, but on any of the substantive terms covered by CESL.
Third, CESL made the right decision to keep its regime optional. But its
heavy dose of mandatory terms makes it unlikely that many firms will rush to
use it. As such, CESL represents a lost opportunity for market liberalization,
which could have generated far greater social benefits.

